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Donald Hirsch 
This report projects hat current policies and economic projections ill 
mean for the ability of households on safety-net benefits and on the ne 
National Living age (NL) to meet minimum needs in the present 
Parliament.  
Fiscal austerity is likely to orsen the ability of many lo-income households to make ends meet in the 
next fe years, although some household types ill be in a position to improve their living standards 
through general age groth and through the rapid increase in minimum ages for over-25s through 
the NL. orking-age households ho are not orking ill find things ever tougher, as ill orking 
lone parents on lo earnings, despite pay groth. Pensioners, single people on lo pay and some couples 
ith children here both parents ork full-time are best positioned to make gains. 
 
The report estimates: 
 
• ho far various types of non-orking household ill fall short of meeting a Minimum Income 
Standard in 2020, compared ith 2010 and 2015; 
• ho the income of households here people ork full-time on minimum ages ill compare to this 
standard in 2020 compared ith 2010 and 2015; 
• the influence of public policy and inflation rates on these results. 
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Executive summary 
In the past five years, evidence on hat households need for an acceptable living standard, according to 
the general public, shos that minimum costs have risen significantly faster than the incomes of non-
orking and lo-paid families. This leaves them further short of the minimum required than before. This 
report projects ho this situation ill develop by 2020, based on current and nely announced policies 
and forecasts of inflation and earnings. It assumes Universal Credit ill have been implemented, and 
considers the situation of nely claiming households according to their family composition and ork 
status. The projections look at examples of the effects on a range of non-orking household types, and 
at orking households on lo pay ith certain orking patterns. They do not attempt to count the 
overall number of inners and losers, rather they seek to sho ho levels of social protection are 
changing over the course of a decade. 
 
Looking first at those ho are not orking and depend on ‘safety net’ benefits, the projections sho a 
further deterioration for orking-age families, but an improvement for pensioners. By 2020, pensioner 
benefits ill be sufficient to bring incomes above the minimum needed, helped by their link to earnings 
groth. orking-age households ill lose from a combination of a four-year freeze in cash benefits, a 
flat-rate loss of £10.45 a eek for all ne claimants ithout children from 2017 and a much bigger cut 
for ne claims for more than to children. The result ill be that non-orking families ill have only 
around half of hat they need by 2020, compared ith nearly to-thirds in 2010, and larger families ill 
be orse off still.  single person’s out-of-ork benefits ill have declined from just over 40 per cent to 
only 35 per cent of a minimum budget. In cash terms, the shortfall beteen disposable income and 
minimum budgets ill have typically gron by around £3,000 a year for a family ith one or to children, 
and by £6,000 for a couple ith three children. 
 
For orking families on minimum pay rates, a more complex picture emerges. Real-terms cuts in in-ork 
benefits and a reduction in the amount that can be earned before tax credits and the Universal Credit 
start being ithdran ill cause significant losses. Better support for childcare and higher minimum 
ages for the over-25s ill produce offsetting gains. Overall: 
 
• The NL ill produce the greatest increase in living standards for orkers ithout children, ho 
have little to lose in means-tested support, and for the first time a single person orking full-time ill 
have close to the minimum required. 
• In some circumstances, couples ith children on the NL could become better off in 2020 than 
they ould be on the national minimum age (NM) today, despite the cuts to in-ork support. This 
depends on both partners orking full-time to benefit fully from the pay increase, something a 
minority of families do. Those ith full-time childcare ill benefit from additional childcare support, 
hile some families on the NL ithout childcare ill have earnings high enough to make them 
ineligible for in-ork support, alloing them to benefit from further pay increases ithout losing 
benefits. 
• Families ho ork part-time ill be less ell positioned to make gains, unless they change their 
orking hours. The incentive to ork full-time ill be improved by higher ages and more childcare 
support, but parents orking an additional hour ill still be only slightly better off – by about £2 an 
hour on the NL, or £1.35 if they pay for childcare for one child (or less if more than one child 
requires childcare). 
• The biggest losses among orking families ill be felt by lone parents, by large families and by those 
ith childcare costs that exceed maximum levels eligible for support – something that ill become 
more common over time if past increases in the cost of childcare continue in future, unless those 
maximum levels are raised. 
• These trends ill lead to some significant gains and losses for orking families. This is expressed in 
terms of the change in ho far their disposable income falls short of meeting the Minimum Income 
Standard hen each adult orks full-time on the NL in 2020, compared ith on the NM in 
2010: for a couple ith to young children, the shortfall is projected to be about £1,800 a year in 
2020, £600 loer than it as in 2010. For a lone parent ith a child under to, the shortfall is 
projected to gro to over £4,000 a year by 2020, a tenfold increase compared ith 2010 hen it 
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as £400. In these examples the orking couple ill maintain a living standard about 10 per cent 
belo the minimum, hereas the orking lone parent hoever ill be about 30 per cent short by 
2020 compared ith only 3per cent in 2010. 
• Overall, the changes ill improve ork incentives in most cases, although for families ith children 
this is more because they have been made orse off out of ork than better off in ork. In 
particular, cuts in out-of-ork benefits means that in most cases, the reard for orking ill gro 
even here in-ork incomes fall too. For example, a orking couple ith three children ill be £37 a 
eek orse off in 2020 than in 2010, but out of ork ill be £117 a eek orse off. n exception is 
a lone parent ith a young child; the ork incentive for this family type ill be £23 a eek loer in 
2020 than it as 2010. 
 
These projections are subject to various uncertainties, of hich the most significant is the inflation rate.  
freeze in benefit rates ill be more harmful if inflation is higher than the lo levels forecast. This could 
ipe out projected gains for some households, particularly those couples ith children ho are projected 
to be better off if the forecasts are correct.  
 
In conclusion, the projections presented here sho that the 2010s are likely to have seen big changes in 
living standards for many lo-income households. Most clearcut is the substantial fall for those out of 
ork, ith families ith children projected typically to have only half hat they need at the end of the 
decade compared ith to-thirds at the start. Pensioners and lo-paid orking households ithout 
children ill make the clearest gains. mong orking families, lone parents and families ith three or 
more children in ill be the biggest losers, hile couples ho both ork could do better, depending on 
hether the benign projection of high age increases but lo inflation turns out to be correct. Overall, 
the freeze and cuts in benefits create risks for all families hose income is supported by the state, ith 
even large pay rises not being guaranteed to make them better off overall. 
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1 Introduction 
Folloing the economic donturn in 2008, there as a steady increase in the number of people in the 
United Kingdom in households falling belo the Minimum Income Standard (Padley et al., 2015). This 
standard is based on research into hat things people need to buy as a minimum for a socially acceptable 
standard of living, as specified by members of the general public. Households that do not reach the 
standard include both those relying on out-of-ork benefits and those here people ork but are on 
lo ages. orking-age benefits do not get close to raising households above the minimum standard, 
and the minimum age is generally insufficient to get households to this level, even supplemented by in-
ork benefits. Moreover, the gap beteen both out-of-ork and minimum-age incomes and MIS has 
idened substantially in recent years (Hirsch, 2015a).  
 
Ho is this likely to change in the next five years? Plans for the present Parliament set out in the 
Summer Budget 2015 provide a fairly detailed picture of ho public policy ill influence the incomes of 
orse-off households. To main contradictory influences can be expected to affect the adequacy of the 
incomes of those relying on out-of-ork benefits and on minimum-age income. On the one hand, real 
age groth and increases to the personal tax alloance are likely to improve orking incomes relative 
to minimum household budgets. Beteen 2015 and 2020, consumer prices are projected to gro by just 
9 per cent, but average earnings by over 20 per cent in cash terms (OBR, 2015). Moreover, the ne 
NL announced in the Summer Budget 2015, a supplement to the NM for the over-25s, ill raise 
minimum pay by nearly 40 per cent in cash terms by 2020. On the other hand, planned real-terms cuts 
in benefits, in and out of ork, ill pull in the opposite direction, although additional support for childcare 
should mitigate this for some families.  
 
This report projects change beteen 2015 and 2020 in the amount by hich various household types 
depending on out-of-ork benefits and on the NM/NL fall short of meeting MIS, taking into 
account projected inflation, earnings increases and fiscal policies. It dras on economic forecasts by the 
Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2015), on policies announced and confirmed in the Summer 
Budget), on announced policies of the nely elected government, mainly to 2019, and on stated 
scenarios for policies thereafter. For context, the report also shos hat happened to income adequacy 
relative to MIS beteen 2010 and 2015.  
 
The report therefore gives a picture of ho policy and economic developments have affected the 
economic ellbeing of some of the UK’s orst-off households over the recent difficult economic years, 
and ho they might do so in a period here real ages groth returns but fiscal austerity continues.  
 
The central projections make a series of assumptions about the economy and public policy, hich are 
subject to unpredictable change. In this sense they are not intended as firm forecasts, but rather as an 
illustration of the current direction of travel. The main assumptions are that:  
 
Prices 
• Prices ill rise as forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) (2015); 
• Childcare costs ill increase in line ith forecast earnings groth and hence about 1–2 per cent per 
year faster than general prices, hich is broadly in line ith recent experience;  
•  MIS budgets ill not change in content, and ill rise in price at the same rate as the Consumer Prices 
Index.  variation on this assumption shos hat ould happen if they rose faster than this, by one 
percentage point a year, hich is broadly in line ith MIS findings to date. The past in this respect is 
not necessarily a guide to the future, but the inflation variation also takes into account the possibility 
that prices generally rise faster than the very lo level forecast by the OBR. 
Earnings 
• Earnings ill rise as forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (2015); 
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• The NL ill rise evenly from the announced level of £7.20 an hour in 2016 to £9.00 in 2020. (This 
is the ‘headline’ political commitment, although the benchmark on hich it is based, 60 per cent of 
median pay for over-25s, is forecast to be slightly higher, £9.35.) 
Tax 
• Tax alloances ill rise as announced to 2017/18 and steadily to the promised £12,500 a year by 
2020/21.  
Benefits 
• orking-age benefits and the Universal Credit ill be frozen until 2019 as announced. In 2020, the 
projections assume that benefit rates rise ith prices; 
• The amount you can earn before entitlement to benefits start to be reduced (the ‘disregard’, also 
called the ork alloance in Universal Credit) ill be reduced in 2016 (and abolished for those 
ithout children), as announced in the Summer Budget 2015, and then frozen. Stated policy is to 
freeze ork alloances to 2019, but the projections assume that they also do not rise in 2020, as 
they have never systematically been linked to inflation; 
• Policies for altering entitlements to in- and out-of-ork benefits – such as removing the eligibility 
for Child Tax Credit for a third child – ill follo the timing announced in the Summer Budget; 
• Pension Credit ill continue to increase in line ith earnings (the present policy); 
• Support for childcare in Universal Credit ill rise to 85 per cent from 2016 as planned, but the limits 
on the level of childcare eligible for such support ill remain frozen as they have since 2006.  
Childcare 
• The increase in free childcare for three- and four-year-olds from September 2017 ill reduce 
childcare costs for families paying for childcare for children of these ages. 
Note also that the projections consider benefit entitlements from the point of vie of a ne claimant 
each year. Some cuts in tax credits and Universal Credit being introduced in 2017 are not being applied 
to existing claimants (except hen they have a third or subsequent child). Hoever, the present analysis is 
concerned ith ho levels of social protection are changing over the long term, so does not take account 
of this transitional protection.  
 
The folloing analysis considers the complex picture applying to different groups over the next five years 
in three sections. 
 
Section 2 looks at the overall picture, shoing ho the percentage of MIS achieved by a range of 
different household types is projected to change by 2020 and ho this compares ith hat they 
achieved in 2010. It shos some very different experiences in terms of ho incomes relative to MIS are 
likely to gro or shrink. 
 
Section 3 presents an account of ho and hy these changes differ substantially for various household 
types. It distinguishes three categories: those likely to see substantial increases in income over the next 
fe years, those that might stand still or make modest gains and those likely to become significantly 
orse off. It identifies hich policies are driving these differences. 
 
Section 4 considers the extent to hich inflation rates and upratings policies are influencing these 
results. It shos the effect of ending inflation-based upratings, and ho much greater this effect might 
be if the cost of a minimum basket gros by more than the very modest inflation levels forecast. 
 
Note: the role of scenario-based projections 
The purpose of the projections in this report is to illustrate ays in hich certain types of lo-income 
households are likely to become better or orse off over the next five years. Unlike some projections 
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modelling outcomes across the population, it is not intended to count the overall numbers of inners and 
losers, but rather to use scenarios to help understand the factors at ork in different situations. Note in 
particular that: 
  
• For orking households, the example of a full-time orker has been used as a starting point even 
though families have a ide variety of orking patterns ith no single model prevailing. This helps 
sho the potential for a family to earn an adequate living through ork, hich in the past has been 
limited for those on lo ages. s a comparison, examples of part-time orking are brought in later; 
• For families ith children, the examples start ith those ho pay for childcare, even though many 
families do not. gain, this is linked to shoing hether families have opportunities to make ends 
meet, here childcare may be needed, and other examples here childcare is not required are also 
brought in for comparison. 
 
It should also be pointed out that, even though these projections aim to sho the situation taking 
account of the Summer Budget  2015, hich set important policies for the present Parliament, unlike 
some ‘budget analysis’ it is not a ‘before and after the Budget’ comparison of ho the future ill look. 
Rather, it compares the future as it looks under Budget policies and projections to the present and the 
past. In other ords, its perspective is ider than the effect of a set of policy announcements, looking at 
ho the orld ill have changed from the start to the end of the present decade. 
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2 Overall patterns of income 
adequacy 2010–2020 
Since its inception in 2008, the Minimum Income Standard has produced data for income requirements 
for a ide range of household types. Figures 1 and 2 look at a selection of households types, considering 
ho their living standards have changed since 2010, and ho they are projected to change beteen no 
and 2020. This is expressed in terms of ho disposable income on out-of-ork benefits and on the 
NM/NL compares ith minimum required budgets. The graphs sho income as a percentage of hat 
is required, and the tables sho the money values (expressed in 2015 £s) of the budget requirement, 
actual disposable income, and hence the surplus or shortfall that households experience. Throughout this 
report disposable income means income after payment of all direct taxes, receipt of benefits and tax 
credits/Universal Credit and payment of rent, childcare and Council Tax. It allos comparison beteen 
hat households have available and the required budgets based on the lists of goods and services 
compiled by the public in the MIS research.  
 
Figure 1 and Table 1 consider the situation for non-orking households relying on safety net benefits. It 
shos that orking-age households ho are not orking ill have seen a dramatic fall during the present 
decade in ho far they fall short of being able to afford a minimum living standard. Specifically, they sho 
that: 
 
• Pensioners, ho started the decade ith about enough to live on (if receiving the income guaranteed 
by the means-tested Pension Credit), ill be in a similar situation in 2020, reversing a modest decline 
in the past five years. The recent decline occurred despite the fact that the Pension Credit rose 
roughly in line ith the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) during this period. Essential costs such as 
heating and food and hence a minimum budget rose faster than this index. In the coming period, on 
the other hand, real earnings groth and the link of pensioner benefits to earnings should move 
things in the opposite direction.  
• Out-of-ork families ith children, ho started the decade ith nearly to-thirds of the minimum, 
ill have only around half of hat they need by 2020. They too have been hit by rising costs, but 
hereas pensioner benefits have been increased in line ith CPI, orking-age benefits have fallen 
behind inflation. They have increased by 1 per cent per year since 2013 and from 2016 to 2019 ill 
receive no increase at all. In addition, the benefits lo-income families receive to provide help ith 
the cost of raising children ill reduce in cash terms for ne claimants from 2017. No ne claimants 
ill receive the £10.45 per eek family element of Child Tax Credit (CTC) or its equivalent in 
Universal Credit. The remaining child element ill be paid for up to to children only. The family 
examples in Figure 1 have been selected to illustrate ho the rate at hich benefit adequacy declines 
for different families ill be affected by these changes. The somehat greater decline experienced by 
a to-person (lone parent plus one) compared ith a four-person (couple plus to) family reflects 
the fact that the loss of the flat-rate family element impacts a smaller family more in proportion to 
their overall budget. On the other hand, any nely claiming family ith three or more children ill 
have more than £50 a eek less after 2017, and in the three-child example shon, this causes a 
dramatic fall in income adequacy.  three-child family ill receive a similar proportion of required 
income in benefits in 2020 as single people ithout children received in 2010: ell under half of 
hat they need, compared ith over 60 per cent in 2010. 
• n out-of-ork single orking age adult ill fall even further short of being able to meet their needs 
by 2020 compared ith no. Not only ill Income Support be frozen at £73.10 a eek, regardless of 
rising costs, but in addition, a single person (ho in this example is assumed to live in private rented 
housing) is almost certain to have to pay part of this amount toards their rent. This is a result of the 
freeze in Local Housing lloance, meaning that Housing Benefit is unlikely to cover their rent in full. 
For example, if someone renting a one-bedroom flat at the average LH rate outside London of 
£102 a eek (Valuation Office gency, 2015) had a cumulative rent increase of nine per cent in the 
next five years (equal to the projected increase in CPI), they ould have to pay £9 extra in rent out of 
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their £73.10 in basic benefit. This helps explain hy a single person’s benefit is expected to cover 
barely a third of minimum costs by the end of the decade, even ith only modest inflation. 
Figure 2 and the accompanying tables look at the more complex picture for orking households on lo 
ages. It looks at a benchmark of families here the parent/s ork full-time. In practice, families ith 
children have a ide variety of orking patterns, and in only about three out of ten orking families do 
both parents or a lone parent ork full-time (Padley et al., 2015). Hoever, this benchmark based on 
full-time ork indicates at least the potential for a family to achieve an acceptable living standard through 
ork on the NM/NL. Figure 2 adds a comparison beteen the position under Universal Credit and 
the tax credit system, hich as not necessary in Figure 1, since the to systems give the same 
entitlement for those not orking. 
 
Figure 2 expands the range of examples used in Figure 1, to illustrate the folloing phenomena, hich 
can be observed by looking across household types: 
 
• For those ithout children, hile real-terms falls in ages since 2010 have made income less 
adequate, this ill be more than compensated by projected real increases in earnings and in tax 
alloances, particularly for those ho benefit from the ne NL. Indeed, a couple orking full-time 
on that age ill be able to earn more than £35,000 beteen them, giving them a disposable income 
that is comfortably above the minimum needed for a decent living standard according to the public.  
single person orking full-time ill be able to get close to MIS for the first time since the measure 
as first reported in 2008. 
• orking lone parent families typically had nearly as much income as they needed as a minimum in 
2010, but have faced a groing shortfall ith deteriorating benefits and falling real ages. The sitch 
to Universal Credit tends to reduce their disposable income (if orking full-time), hich in most cases 
is projected to fall further relative to the minimum by 2020. The exception in these examples is a 
lone parent family ith to young children. This family’s gain from better childcare support (the 30-
hour free entitlement and the 85 per cent rate paid in Universal Credit) compensates for other cuts 
under Universal Credit, but still leaves them orse off than under tax credits. 
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Figure 1: Safety net benefits as a percentage of minimum budgets, 2010–2020 
Income net of rent, childcare and Council Tax, relative to MIS budgets (100%=MIS level) 
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Table 1: Disposable income compared to MIS budget on out of ork benefits 
(eekly, CPI-adjusted to 2015 prices) 
 
Pensioner couple 2010 2015 2020 projection 
MIS budget £228 £244 £244 
Income £232 £235 £259 
Surplus/shortfall £4 -£10 £15 
    
Lone parent +1 (infant) 2010 2015 2020 projection 
MIS budget £244 £274 £274 
Income £157 £156 £138 
Surplus/shortfall -£86 -£118 -£136 
    
Couple + 2 (pre-school, primary) 2010 2015 2020 projection 
MIS budget £427 £462 £462 
Income £264 £264 £240 
Surplus/shortfall -£163 -£197 -£221 
    
Couple + 3 (pre-school, primary, 
secondary) 
2010 2015 2020 projection 
MIS budget £530 £571 £571 
Income £326 £331 £253 
Surplus/shortfall -£204 -£240 -£317 
    
Single 2010 2015 2020 projection 
MIS budget £181 £181 £181 
Income £73 £72 £64 
 
 
Surplus/shortfall 
-£107 -£110 -£118 
 
 
• orking couple families ith children have tended to do better, helped by the fact that the age 
increase applies in these examples to to parents, hereas most of the cuts in benefits are per family 
or per child. Couple families have also tended to do relatively better out of the change to Universal 
Credit, and this has been accentuated by the Summer Budget 2015, hich moved from a higher 
ork alloance for lone parents than couples to an equal one only slightly belo the previous rate 
for couples.  
• One influence, hich affects hich household types are inners and losers, ill be better support for 
childcare. To contrast the fortunes of those ith and ithout childcare costs, Figure 2 adds examples 
of families ith secondary school children, for hom childcare is not needed. In the case of a lone 
parent ith to children, the trend is more favourable in the case here they are younger and gain 
from the additional childcare support. For couples, hoever, there are also gains here childcare is 
not needed, for reasons explained belo.  
These multiple influences on the projected adequacy of incomes for orking families over the next five 
years are explored further in the folloing section. 
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Figure 2: Disposable income on national minimum age/National Living age 
relative to MIS, 2010–2020 
Income after taxes, benefits, rent, childcare and Council Tax, relative to MIS budgets (100%=MIS level) 
 
a) orking-age adult ith and ithout children (ordered by % in 2010) 
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Table 2a: Disposable income compared to MIS budget orking full-time on 
NM/NL (eekly, CPI-adjusted to 2015 prices) 
 
Lone parent + 1 (infant) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £243.58 £273.92 £273.91 £273.91 
Income £236.55 £235.20 £211.68 £194.20 
Surplus/shortfall -£7 -£39 -£62 -£80 
     
Lone parent + 2 (pre-school, primary) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £327.36 £366.91 £366.91 £366.91 
Income £315.90 £319.73 £282.12 £296.72 
Surplus/shortfall -£11 -£47 -£85 -£70 
     
Lone parent + 3 (pre-school, primary, 
secondary) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £462.46 £469.59 £469.59 £469.59 
Income £419.32 £398.41 £349.02 £309.70 
Surplus/shortfall -£43 -£71 -£121 -£160 
     
Lone parent + 2 (both secondary) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £388.33 £422.06 £422.06 £422.06 
Income £326.58 £324.35 £325.24 £308.88 
Surplus/shortfall -£62 -£98 -£97 -£113 
     
Single 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget -£180.78 £181.40 £181.39 £181.39 
Income -£141.93 £127.76 £153.73 £175.50 
Surplus/shortfall 38.85245 -£54 -£28 -£6 
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b) Couple ith and ithout children (ordered by % in 2010) 
 
  
13 
Table 2b: Disposable income compared to MIS budget orking full-time on 
NM/NL (eekly, CPI-adjusted to 2015 prices) 
 
Couple 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £284 £302 £302 £302 
Income £325 £336 £336 £440 
Shortfall £40 £34 £34 £137 
     
Couple + 1 (infant) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget 
-
£329 £375 £375 £375 
Income 
-
£335 £321 £320 £325 
Surplus/shortfall -£6 -£54 -£55 -£50 
     
Couple + 2 younger (pre-school, 
primary) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £427 £462 £462 £462 
Income £382 £386 £391 £427 
Surplus/shortfall -£45 -£75 -£70 -£34 
     
Couple + 2 older (both 
secondary) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £487 £517 £517 £517 
Income £426 £428 £434 £481 
Surplus/shortfall -£61 -£89 -£83 -£36 
     
Couple + 3 (pre-school, primary, 
secondary) 2010 
2015 
(tax 
credit 
regime) 
2015 
(Universal 
Credit 
regime) 
2020 
projection 
MIS budget £532 £571 £571 £571 
Income £439 £446 £458 £440 
Surplus/shortfall -£93 -£124 -£112 -£130 
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3 inners and losers 
This section considers in more detail the trajectory beteen 2015 and 2020 for three types of 
household situation. First, it considers those for hom a return to real earnings groth is likely to raise 
living standards substantially. Second, it looks at household types ho may become a bit better or orse 
off by 2020, but not get much closer to closing a shortfall beteen their disposable income and hat 
they need. Third, it considers those household types subject to deep cuts in already inadequate living 
standards. In each case, it identifies the main influences that produce these results. Most of the discussion 
compares the situation of households over time ith orking patterns held constant, but at the end of 
this section, some issues of ork incentives, that could potentially change orking patterns, are 
considered. 
 
The graphs in this section illustrate the changing balance beteen ages and in-ork benefits in 
contributing to household income, over the period 2015–20. In doing so, the analysis simplifies the 
picture in to ays that are important to note. First, it assumes all claimants are in receipt of Universal 
Credit. In reality, families are only gradually being moved on to this system, meaning that many ill in fact 
continue to rely on the existing system for some time to come (and indeed they ill do so under a tax 
credit regime that ithdras benefits more quickly ith rising income, folloing changes introduced by 
the Summer Budget 2015). Second, the projections sho the situation for ne claimants only, hile in 
reality there ill be transitional protections in place for existing claimants. Hoever, since the main 
emphasis of this report is to consider long-term changes and to capture ho changes to the system are 
likely to impact on living standards over time, the graphs are restricted to shoing ho the age/benefits 
balance ill change under UC. 
 
inners 
Beteen 2015 and 2020, a projected 22 per cent groth in earnings (OBR, 2015) ill be nearly 
matched by an 18 per cent increase in tax alloances (on the Conservative Party manifesto pledge) 
producing take-home pay increases of around at least 20 per cent. This implies around 12 per cent 
groth in real incomes on present inflation projections. hile any projection of healthy groth in real 
earnings five years ahead cannot be treated in any ay as a reliable forecast, these figures sho that 
among the general orking population, there is a good prospect that many orking people in the UK ill 
become substantially better off. 
 
To big exceptions to this are clear. Public sector employees (other than those belo the NL) ill be 
subject to tight pay restraint – generally to increases of only 1 per cent a year. nd the three million 
orking households ho rely on in-ork benefits ill see cuts in the real levels of these benefits, 
together ith their automatic reduction as pay rises, claing back much of the gain. In other ords, the 
orst-off orking households ho need help from the government in making ends meet can rely less 
than other households on favourable trends in market earnings to raise their living standards.  
 
Nevertheless, the huge increase in the minimum hourly age rate that must be paid to orkers over 25, 
of 38 per cent beteen pril 2015 and pril 2020, together ith a rising personal tax alloance, ill 
mean that many of the biggest proportionate earnings increases ill go to orkers at the bottom end of 
the labour market. Many of these ill be in households on modest incomes but that do not have 
significant entitlements to in-ork benefits, so are in a position to be net inners. 
 
The most clear cut example is a couple ithout children, both orking full-time on the NM, ho 
presently earn about £25,000 beteen them, ith no entitlement to in-ork benefits. hile their 
income is modest, it is already above the amount needed for a minimum living standard. The NL ill pay 
them £35,000 in total in 2020, leaving them ith over 20 per cent more post-tax income than no in 
real terms. 
 
Other lo-paid household types that ill benefit from the move to the NL are those ho have a 
relatively small entitlement to in-ork support at present. Significant increases in earnings could 
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potentially ‘float’ these households off means-tested support, after hich they ill no longer be 
vulnerable either to cuts in this support or to the effect of the income taper that clas back further gains 
in pay. To examples of such households are shon in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Some households orking full-time on minimum age ‘floated off’ 
Universal Credit by National Living age 
Disposable income (£ per eek, current prices) broken don by composition, and shortfall ith MIS level 
 
a) Single person aged over 25 
 
 
 
b) Couple ith to secondary school children 
 
 
 
Figure 3a shos that a single person, ho on the minimum age orking full-time is entitled to a small 
amount of help through Universal Credit, ill soon have earnings that mean they are no longer entitled 
to help from Universal Credit hen in ork. This ill be precipitated in 2016 by the abolition of the ork 
alloance (disregarded earnings) for those ithout children, but this loss ill quickly be compensated by 
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the rapid increase in the NL. This means that they ill only have £6 less than MIS by 2020, compared 
ith £28 today. 
 
Moreover, some families ith children on the NL ill be able to get clear of the level at hich they 
receive Universal Credit by 2020, and in so doing quickly get significantly closer to the MIS level 
(although in most cases ill not reach it). In particular, this applies to couples ith one or to children, 
ho neither pay for childcare nor have high rent entitlements under UC. The example shon in Figure 3b 
is a couple ith to secondary school children, living in social housing. By 2018, their full-time earnings 
ill be more than the amount that entitles them to Universal Credit. This is partly because their earnings 
ill be higher, and partly because entitlement to UC ill run out on a loer level of earnings, for to 
reasons: the baseline UC entitlement ill be loer in real terms, and the ork alloance (the amount you 
can earn before entitlement to benefits in ork start to be reduced) ill be loer. The important point to 
note is that once this means-tested element of income is no longer in play, increasing pay feeds much 
more effectively into improving living standards, as represented by the declining shortfall compared ith 
MIS. 
 
To caveats to this second example need to be noted. One is that the calculation may be compromised 
by the fact that it assumes the family are paying a social rent, but the family ill have joint earnings above 
the £30,000 threshold (outside of London), above hich the Summer Budget states they ill have to ‘pay 
to stay’ by paying a market rent or near market rent. Hoever the details of this policy are still to be 
consulted upon. nother caveat is that this only applies to a case here both partners ork full-time. 
ith either a higher rent or loer joint ages, the family may still be entitled to some Universal Credit. 
Nevertheless, Figure 3b illustrates ho higher ages and loer UC entitlements may reduce a family’s 
UC to zero, reducing the scope for further cuts in in-ork benefits harming them, and increasing the 
scope for rising ages to help them.  
 
Specifically, any full-time orking couple ith children ill have no UC entitlement by 2020 if they have 
no childcare costs and eligible rent belo a certain level: around £190 a eek ith one child, or £130 
ith to or more children.  
 
nother type of family here significant net gains could be made by 2020 is one able to benefit fully 
from the increase in support for childcare costs through the increased reimbursement rate in UC 
combined ith the introduction of 30 hours’ free childcare for three- and four-year-olds. Figure 4 
shos ho a couple ith to children requiring childcare, one for a pre-school child, is projected to gain 
over the period. In 2016, the additional help ith childcare costs available through UC increases the 
baseline UC entitlement for this family (hich in practice means its UC entitlement stays stable despite an 
11 per cent age hike hich ould otherise result in a loer UC entitlement as higher earnings result 
in UC income being tapered). From 2018, the additional free hours of childcare ill also help to reduce 
the costs for this family type. These factors combine ith the age increase to create a net gain despite 
offsetting cuts in the real value of UC. 
 
Note from the last to examples that a couple ith up to to children can do relatively ell in this period 
either because they have no childcare costs and therefore full-time ages on the NL gets them clear 
of UC or because high childcare costs have become more affordable, enabling them to gain from orking 
full-time ith small children. The common factor here is to parents orking full-time. One issue is 
therefore hether couples on lo income ill become better placed to increase their living standards by 
increasing their hours, as a result of higher ages and better support for childcare. t present, 25 per 
cent of all couples ith children and just 6 per cent of those belo the MIS level both ork full-time. Not 
orking full-time increases the risk of having an income belo MIS, and over a third (36 per cent) of 
couple families ith children here at least one parent orks but not both full-time are belo MIS 
(Padley et al., 2015). These families could potentially get closer to an acceptable living standard by 
orking extra hours – subject to appropriate ork being available and this being compatible ith family 
life. The section on ork incentives belo notes that reards for increasing hours ill improve. 
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Figure 4:  family made better off through improved ages and childcare support 
Disposable income (£ per eek, current prices) broken don by composition, and shortfall ith MIS level 
 
Couple, both orking full-time, ith to children, pre-school and primary age 
  
Families balancing gains and losses 
 second category under these projections is lo-earning orking families ho have a mixture of gains 
and losses that may leave the balance positive or negative according to individual circumstances. Such 
families face less risk of further deterioration in living standards than those only subjected to benefit cuts 
ith no offsetting gains, but less opportunity to raise their living standards than those described above. It 
is important to remember that, for families on lo ages, this leaves them ell short of meeting 
minimum needs. 
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Figure 5: Couples ith children here higher ages offset by reduced benefits  
Disposable income (£ per eek, current prices) broken don by composition, and 
shortfall ith MIS level 
 
Couple, one orking full-time and one part-time, ith to children 
 
a) Younger children – pre-school and primary 
 
b) Older children – both secondary 
 
Typically, many lo-earning orking couples ith children are likely to come into this category. s noted 
above, having to earners at the NL rate boosts these families’ earnings substantially. Hoever, cuts in 
in-ork support ill not alays be offset as much as in the example shon in Figure 4, hich assumes 
substantial gains both from full-time earnings and from higher rates of support for childcare costs. Most 
families ith children do not have to full-time orkers, and relatively fe on lo earnings pay a large 
amount for their childcare (Hirsch and Valadez, 2015). Nevertheless it should be noted that better 
support may help more to take on paid childcare and ork more hours, assuming suitable ork and 
childcare are available. Figure 5 shos examples of couples ith younger and ith older children here 
one parent orks full-time and one part-time. In these examples, there is a more or less even balance 
beteen gains and losses.  
19 
Figure 5 shos that for couples orking less than full-time, gains are projected over the next five years 
as a result of rising ages, hile losses occur from falling levels of Universal Credit. The net result is living 
standards staying fairly stable but at substantially less than the minimum required for a decent living 
standard. (Since this example is based on families ith both earners in minimum age jobs, ho gain most 
from the NL, it follos that couples orking less than full time and on Universal Credit here at least 
one person earns above the minimum age ill become orse off, because their ages ill not rise as 
much to compensate for cuts in support.) This is true for families ith younger children and ith older 
children. t present, a younger family has similar net income hether orking shorter or longer hours on 
the minimum age, since the net gain from more paid hours is similar to the net cost of more hours of 
childcare. Compared ith the full-time orking case (Figure 4), the part-time orking case (Figure 5a), 
ill be helped less by improved support for childcare, unless the family takes advantage of this support to 
increase its hours. Otherise, it ill continue to be more than £80 short of meeting the MIS budget. For 
a family ith to older children (Figure 5b), non-childcare expenses are greater (for example their food 
and clothing budgets are higher), and this causes a larger shortfall for families not orking full-time. This 
shortfall is projected to gro about in line ith inflation, as rising earnings are offset by falling in-ork 
benefits.  
 
Losers  
The to main categories of lo-income household likely to be substantially orse off in 2020 than today 
(and ho have also lost out since 2010) are orking-age people on out-of-ork benefits and orking 
lone parents.  
 
Figure 1 has already shon the picture for those relying on orking-age benefits. s described earlier, 
they are falling ever further short of being able to afford the MIS budget.  
 
Figure 2a shos a similar pattern for orking lone parents. ith only one income, a lone parent gains 
less than a orking couple from the NL, but has tended to lose more from the Summer Budget 2015 
as a result of facing a bigger cut in the ork alloance, increasing losses experienced in the sitch to 
Universal Credit. Some families, such as a lone parent ith a pre-school and primary school-aged child, 
ill become a bit better off on Universal Credit in 2016 as a result of the increase in childcare provision, 
but ill still be slightly orse off in 2020 than they are under tax credits today. Other orking lone 
parent families ill become substantially orse off than they are today, even ith the benefit of a full-
time NL and increased personal tax alloance.  
 
Figure 6 shos to examples of the greatest losers among orking lone parents. One is a lone parent 
ith a child under to requiring full-time childcare. This family ill gain a bit of childcare support in 2016, 
but they ill quickly exhaust the limit of help that is give through UC. This is because UC only helps ith 
up to £175 per eek in supported fees, but as childcare costs rise, a full-time orking lone parent ill 
have to pay childcare fees in excess of the limit. s a consequence, this family type faces a groing 
shortfall compared ith MIS. In 2010 they ould have been £6 a eek short of meeting MIS; this 
increases to £62 in 2015 (under the UC regime), and they are projected to be a further £24 short by 
2020, i.e. £86 per eek. Such a family ill barely be better off in 2020 orking full-time than a non-
orking family ith the same composition as in 2008 hen MIS as first reported (a full-time NL 
orker is projected to have 71 per cent of MIS in 2020, compared ith 68 per cent in 2008 for an out-
of-ork family). Note that this result ould look significantly different if the limit on childcare support in 
UC, hich has not been uprated for a decade, ere lifted. ithout such a cap, the projected shortfall in 
2020 ould be £30 a eek loer. The case for increasing the cap, and little or no cost, is discussed in 
Hirsch (2015b). 
 
The second example in Figure 6, a lone parent ith three children, ill be much orse off from 2017 (as 
a ne claimant) as a result of the restriction of UC support to to children. The higher NL earnings 
paid to a single person ill not nearly make up for this loss. ith less than to-thirds of the disposable 
income that they need, such a family ill be orse off by 2020 orking full-time than some lone parents 
ere on benefits in 2008. (But note that this does not constitute an erosion of ork incentives since the 
same family not orking ill be far orse off still, getting only 46 per cent of the MIS budget rather than 
66 per cent orking full-time.)  
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Figure 6: orking families ith a groing shortfall in disposable income compared 
ith MIS  
Disposable income (£ per eek, current prices) broken don by composition, and shortfall ith MIS level 
 
Lone parent families orking full-time 
 
a) ith one child aged under to 
 
 
b) ith three children, pre-school, primary and secondary school age 
 
 
 
ork incentives 
The above revie of inners and losers has shon that all out-of-ork orking-age households ill 
become orse off, hile those in ork ill have mixed fortunes. This is likely in many cases to improve 
incentives to ork. But it is orth looking more closely both at changes in the incentive to ork overall 
and at incentives to ork additional hours. This is important both because of the potential impact on 
orking behaviours of such incentives, and also because reards for ork affect the ability of families 
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ho ork more to increase their living standards, regardless of hether their behaviours are affected by 
such calculations. 
 
Table 3 illustrates ho the gap in disposable income beteen not orking and orking full-time on the 
NM/NL is projected to have changed during the current decade, for four household types.  
 
Table 3: Changes in incentives to ork, 2010–2020 
 
 
Table 3 shos a considerable improvement in ork incentives for three out of the four household types 
shon. For a single person and a couple ith to children, this reflects both an improvement in orking 
incomes and a deterioration of out-of-ork incomes, although for the couple ith children the latter is 
much greater. For a couple ith three children, both those in and out of ork become orse off, hit by 
the reduction in child tax credit entitlements, and the improved ‘incentive’ is caused only because the loss 
for non-orking household is greater. For the lone parent ith one small child, there are also losses both 
in and out of ork, but in this case it is the in-ork family that loses more, mainly as a result of the 
capping of childcare support in Universal Credit (see above). 
 
hile this shos a varied picture overall, a generalisation is that here ork incentives for families ith 
children are improving, this is more because they have been made orse off out of ork than better off 
in ork. The NL ill in particular boost ork incentives for those ithout children, but due to the very 
lo living standards that these households face on benefits, their ork incentives are already high.  
 
 second feature of ork incentives is hether it is orth a orking family increasing its orking hours. 
In this respect, ork incentives have often been much eaker than the incentive to ork at all especially 
for families ith young children. This is because the cost of an additional hour of childcare is sometimes 
greater than an hour’s additional age, net of ithdraals through taxation and tax credit/Universal 
Credit ithdraal (Hirsch and Hartfree, 2013). dditional support for childcare and higher ages can 
both help reduce this effect.  
  
Table 4 shos that orkers depending on means-tested in-ork support lose most of any additional 
earnings from orking an extra hour, and this ill remain the case. Hoever relative to the present 
situation here they can keep ell under £1 an hour if paying for childcare, the situation is set to 
improve, and this could encourage more families to ork additional hours. Note that this roughly restores 
the ork incentives to the level they ere in 2010. Since then, rising childcare costs, falling state support 
for childcare and steeper tapering have reduced ork incentives. By 2020, rising real ages and rising 
support for childcare reverses this situation.  
 
  
 
. Difference 
beteen incomes in 
and out of ork, 
£ per eek 2015 
prices 
B. Increased 
ork 
incentive 
2010-2020 
C. Change in income relative 
to MIS, 2010–20 (positive 
value indicates income has 
risen faster than MIS 
requirement). The difference 
beteen these columns is the 
increase in ork incentive 
shon in Column B. 
 
2010 2020 
(i) orking 
incomes 
(ii) Non-
orking 
incomes 
Single £79 £112 £33 £23 -£10 
Lone parent + 1 (infant) £79 £56 -£23 -£73 -£50 
Couple +2 (pre-school, 
primary) 
£118 £187 £69 £11 -£58 
Couple + 3 (pre-school, 
primary, secondary) 
£111 £187 £76 -£37 -£113 
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Table 4: Hourly earnings retained, 2010–2020 
 
Effect of orking extra hour, for taxpayer in family receiving tax credits/Universal Credit (inflation-
adjusted to 2015 prices) 
 
 
Minimum 
hourly 
age (over 
25s) 
Combined 
ithdraal rate 
(tax, NI, taper) 
Retained 
earnings, no 
childcare 
(per hour) 
1 hour 
of 
childcare 
(outside 
London) 
% 
childcare 
paid in tax 
credits/UC 
Retained 
earnings after 
childcare (per 
hour) 
2010 £6.50 70% £1.95 £3.43 80% £1.26 
2015 tax credits £6.50 73% £1.76 £3.77 70% £0.62 
2015 Universal 
Credit £6.50 76.2% £1.55 £3.77 70% £0.42 
Projected 2020 £8.37 76.2% £1.99 £4.26 85% £1.35 
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4 The impact of inflation rates and 
upratings policy 
n important driver of the results reported in these projections is the fact that orking-age benefits are 
not being linked to inflation, and therefore their value is being eroded over time. This guarantees that 
people out of ork become gradually orse off, and contributes to the reduction or elimination of any 
gains from higher ages and loer taxes experienced by those in ork but receiving benefits from the 
state to top up their lo income. 
 
Moreover, the actual rate of inflation has become more directly important to the trend in living standards 
than it as hen benefits ere being uprated ith reference to rising prices. The government has 
announced for four years ahead the amount by hich orking-age benefits ill change (zero). This 
means the degree to hich this represents a real terms cut in the value of benefits ill vary according to 
hether inflation is high or lo. It has also set targets for tax alloances and for the NL quoted in cash 
terms, hich if met ill also be more beneficial the loer the actual inflation rate. 
 
ith this in mind, Table 5 reports on to variations of the current projections. First, it considers hat ill 
happen if the cost of a minimum budget increases by one percentage point a year faster than the 
inflation rate projected by the OBR. This could happen if some essential categories like food, hich are 
more heavily represented in a minimum basket than in the average basket used to calculate the 
Consumer Prices Index, rise relatively rapidly in price. It could also occur if the historically lo forecast of 
a cumulative 9 per cent inflation over five years turns out to be inaccurate. For context, beteen 2010 
and 2015, CPI inflation as a cumulative 12 per cent and the cost of a MIS basket as estimated to have 
risen by 19 per cent. Hence, the alternative scenario shon, hich involves the minimum cost of living 
groing by 14 rather than 9 per cent over the next five years, still represents only moderate inflation 
relative to recent experience.  
 
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 5 sho that under this higher inflation scenario, disposable income on benefits 
and lo ages ould be reduced, albeit by modest amounts. For many families this ould come on top of 
falls already shon in the above projections. The most serious effect ould be on a single person out of 
ork, as a result of the assumption that they ould not have access to social housing and therefore 
ould have to cover rent rises through the non-housing part of benefits, since the Local Housing 
lloance ill not rise ith inflation. This ould push the out-of-ork income available to belo a third 
of hat they need, hich is likely to create severe hardship and difficulties in affording the most basic 
necessities of life. (hile the current projections assume that a family ith children lives in social housing, 
a family unable to access social housing and living in the private rented sector ill suffer from a similar 
larger inflation effect.) 
 
For context, the last to columns of Table 5 sho ho much effect not uprating ill have on disposable 
incomes even if the modest inflation forecasts turn out to be an accurate prediction of basic costs. gain, 
the biggest effect is for single people because of the housing cut. Combining both sides of the table, it 
can be seen that a single person in private housing could be a fifth orse off on out-of-ork benefits as 
a combined result of benefits not being uprated and having a higher than predicted inflation rate. 
 
  
24 
Table 5: Disposable income as a percent of MIS under alternative inflation and 
uprating scenarios 
 
 
. 2015 
B. 2020 ith 
projected 
inflation, 
current 
uprating policy 
C. 2020 ith 
1% a year 
higher 
inflation, 
current 
uprating policy 
%age fall in 
disposable 
income from 
higher inflation 
rate (C 
compared to B) 
D. 2020 ith 
projected 
inflation, 
benefits 
uprated 
%age gain in 
disposable 
income from 
inflation 
uprating (D 
compared to B) 
c) On out of ork  
d) benefits 
     Single 40% 35% 32% 9% 39% 12% 
Lone parent + 1 57% 50% 48% 4% 52% 4% 
Couple +2 57% 52% 50% 4% 54% 4% 
Pensioner 96% 106% 101% 5% 106% 0% 
       e) b) On 
NM/NL
 
      Single 85% 97% 90% 7% 97% 0% 
Lone parent + 1 77% 71% 68% 4% 73% 3% 
Couple +2 85% 93% 89% 4% 95% 2% 
  
This section has shon that forecasts of inners as a result of a healthy groth in ages and very 
modest inflation need to be interpreted ith caution. Projected gains, especially here shon for families 
receiving in-ork benefits, could be reduced or disappear if inflation is above the forecast level. 
Furthermore, the variations shon above do not take account of the possibility that the level of the 
minimum may be influenced not just by changes in living costs but also by improvements in general 
prosperity. Since MIS measures the income needed to maintain a minimum standard appropriate to 
contemporary living, higher living standards generally could potentially influence the minimum set by 
members of the public. This is not inevitable, and it is important to note that hat the public considered 
necessary for a decent standard of living did not systematically track living standards donards hen 
real incomes fell during the recession. It may be that social norms ill be slo to change in a ay that 
increases MIS as incomes start to rise again. Hoever, hen forecasting that some household incomes 
ill start to catch up ith MIS as a result of earnings rising faster than inflation, it is important to bear in 
mind that this benchmark may be a moving target. 
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5 Conclusion 
The projections in this report sho that many lo-income families are set to experience substantial 
changes in their incomes by 2020, causing their living standards to be very different from their 2010 
levels. Most of those ith children ho depend on state help, in or out of ork, ill have seen a big 
deterioration. Others, particularly those ithout children on lo pay, but also some orking couple 
families ith children, could see significant gains.  
 
The most consistent losers ill be those depending mainly or entirely on orking-age benefits, hose 
value is falling steadily. The orst hit are those affected by large additional cuts, including larger families 
and those relying on support for private rents. The result is that by 2020 some non-orking families ith 
children are projected to have less than half the disposable income that they need for hat the public 
considers to be a minimum living standard, don from nearly to-thirds in 2010. For out-of-ork 
singles, the value of benefits ill fall from belo half the minimum to around a third. 
 
In contrast, for households hose income comes holly or mainly from earnings living standards are 
forecast to rise. This also applies to pensioners, much of hose income from the state is set to rise in line 
ith earnings. 
 
For those hose income comes partly from earnings and partly from state transfers, the situation is more 
complex. Cuts in the value of in-ork benefits are being mitigated, for those aged over 25 on lo ages, 
by an exceptionally steep rise in the minimum age to the NL level of £9 by 2020. t the same time, 
an increase in support for childcare ill help offset cuts in other state support for some families.  
 
The biggest inners among lo-paid orkers of these changes ill be those ithout children, ho have 
little or no state benefits to lose, resulting in some becoming more than 20 per cent better off by 2020. 
mong families, the biggest gainers ill be lo-paid couples here both ork full-time. For this type of 
household the gains from rising ages ill more than offset cuts to in-ork benefits, although ith the 
value of in-ork benefits frozen, much of their forecast gain could be iped out if the minimum cost of 
living rises by more than the very modest amounts assumed in these projections. The need for childcare 
is also an influential factor in ho far families ith children see their living standards improve over the 
next five years. Those ithout childcare costs could see their incomes increase to the point here they 
are no longer eligible for in-ork benefits (other than Child Benefit). For those that do need to pay for 
childcare, higher ages and increased childcare support may incentivise them to improve their incomes 
by increasing their hours, subject to the availability of ork that is compatible ith family life. This begins 
to address one of the problematic features of the Universal Credit system, hereby parents are much 
better off for the first fe hours they ork, but their disposable income barely increases ith additional 
hours, especially here childcare costs also have to be paid. The increased support for childcare costs ill 
be a elcome boost for many orking families but does not eliminate the problem, and the amount of 
earnings retained from orking additional hours for those needing to pay for childcare ill still not be 
large.  
 
Lone parent households are more likely to be losers from the combined changes in 2015–20, even if 
they are in ork.  crucial change in the 2015 Summer Budget, hich reduced overall reards from 
ork, as the substantial loering of the ork alloance in Universal Credit for lone parents. This means 
the amount of benefits they are entitled to hen orking begins to be reduced at a loer level of 
earnings. In addition, the gains from a higher age and a higher tax alloance are less significant here 
there is just one earner in the family, and indeed the no-abolished higher ork alloances for lone 
parents ere intended to reflect that disadvantage. Moreover, flat rate cuts such as the abolition of the 
family element of Child Tax Credit hit smaller households harder. The resulting situation is that by 2020 
some lone parents ill be unable to get above about 70 per cent of MIS even by orking full-time. This 
represents a dramatic change since the start of the decade. Then, a lone parent family had to struggle to 
get by on out-of-ork benefits, hich provided about to-thirds of a minimum budget, but if the parent 
orked full-time, even on the minimum age, the family could almost get to the minimum. By 2020, 
even orking full-time the family ill have only just over to-thirds of hat they need, ith out-of-ork 
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benefits providing only half or less of the minimum budget. So hile orking lone parents ill by 2020 
have roughly the same living standards as non-orking lone parents in 2010, ork incentives ill be 
retained through a steep decline in out-of-ork incomes too. 
 
Overall, then, among lo-income households, most orking lone parents and almost all non-orking 
households of orking age are likely to see their living standards decline in the next five years, hile 
pensioners and orking people ithout children are likely to see a substantial improvement. Lo-income 
orking couples ith children ill have mixed fortunes, depending to a large extent on ho able and 
illing both parents are to ork full-time. The NL at least creates ne opportunities for families 
orking in loer paying occupations to provide more adequately for their families. Hoever, in practice, 
most couples ith children – particularly younger children – are likely to continue to have at least one 
person not orking full-time. Thus the great majority of lo-paid families ith children are likely to see 
no improvement in income relative to their needs over the next five years, remaining substantially belo 
a minimum standard of living, and in many cases seeing a serious further deterioration.
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